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TAXABILITY OF SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 contained no statutory provisions
pertaining to the taxability of scholarships and fellowships, and decisions
under that Code turned on whether the grants were excluded as gifts or
included in gross income as compensation. If the recipient could not estab-
lish that the payment was a gift, the grant was included in gross income.1
Thus, the tax status of these grants had to be decided on a case by case
basis. In 1954, Congress enacted section 1172 of the Internal Revenue Code
which was designed to end the uncertainty of the tax status of these grants
by establishing rules for determining their tax treatment.3
Section 117(a) provides that gross income does not include any amount
received as a scholarship or fellowship. In this broad exclusion, Congress
1. I.T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 8.
2. INT. REV. COnE oF 1954, § 117.
a) General Rule-In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) As a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined
in Section 151 (e) (4)), or
(B) As a fellowship grant,
b) Limitations.-
(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees-
In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at
an educational institution . . ., sub-section (a) shall not apply
to that portion if any amount received which represents payment
for teaching, research, or any other services in the nature of
part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the
scholarship or fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other
services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients
of scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as
a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or
other services shall not be regarded as part-time employment
within the meaning of this paragraph.
(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees-
In the case of an individual who is not a candidate for a degree
at an educational institution, . .., subsection (a) shall apply
only within the limitations provided in subparagraph (B).
(B) Extent of Exclusion.-The amount of the scholarship or
fellowship grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any
taxable year shall be limited to an amount equal to $300
times the number of months for which the recipient re-
ceived amounts under the scholarship or fellowship grant
during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be
allowed under subsection (a) after the recipient has been
entitled to exclude under this section for a period of 86
months (whether or not consecutive) amounts received as
a scholarship or fellowship grant while not a candidate for
a degree at an educational institution (as defined in Section
151 (e) (4)).
3. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sem. 17 (1954).
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recognized the traditional difference between a scholarship and a fellow-
ship. The principal feature of a scholarship is pursuit of a regular course
of study, with any research being incidental; a fellowship, on the other
hand, often accents research and specialized educational training, and a
regular study program is incidental. Because of this difference, section
117 (a) grants an exclusion for amounts received as a scholarship only if the
study takes place "at an educational institution," while no such require-
ment is provided in the case of a fellowship grant.
To these broad exclusions, Congress added certain limitations. In the
case of a degree candidate, there is neither a dollar limit on the exclusion
nor are there any qualifications that the donor must meet. However, pay-
ments representing compensation for part time employment, required as a
condition of the grant, are not to be excluded, unless all candidates for
the degree are required to perform these services, whether on scholarship
or not.4 One not a candidate for a degree may only exclude payments from
certain sources5 and the exclusion is limited to $300 per month for a total
period not to exceed 36 months.6
When Congress enacted section 117, it was apparently intended to
be the sole test for exclusion.7 Thus, if an amount can properly be classi-
fied as a scholarship or fellowship, its exclusion is controlled solely by
section 117, even though it might also be classified as a prize or as a gift
under other provisions of the Code.8 Therefore, if a grant to one not a
candidate for a degree exceeds the dollar limits of the section, the excess
is includable in gross income.9
Since section 1 i7 was enacted in part to end the confusion created by
the gift-compensation test under the 1939 Code, one might expect the
section to resolve the basic definitional issue: which payments qualify as
scholarship and fellowships? Yet, nowhere in section 117 or in its legislative
history are the terms scholarship and fellowship defined. Either Congress
was satisfied that these terms had generally accepted meanings which were
not open to question'O or that there was no simple definition which would
resolve the hard cases and that these might better be left to resolution by
the Service and the courts on a case by case basis. On the one hand, the
broad exclusion of the section might indicate that all payments to a stu-
dent are to be excluded. Within the same section, however, exclusion is
denied to compensatory payments. This provision, if logically extended
would require any payment to a student that had a compensatory element
4. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 117(b) (1).
5. Section 117 (b) (2) (A) allows the exclusion for non-degree candidates
only if the grantor is an organization exempt from tax under Section 501 (a), a
foreign government, an international organization, or the United States or any
of its agencies.
6. INT. REY. CODE of 1954, § 117 (b) (2) (B).
7. See reports quoted note 3 supra; Clarence Piess 40 T.C. 78, 81 (1963);
Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117, 1121 (1959).
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 74, 102; See REv. RUL. 59-80, 1959-1 Cum.
BULL. 39.
9. See Rv. RUL. 66-241, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 40; RV. RUL. 59-80, 1959-1
Cum. BULL. 39.
10. Frank Thomas Bachmura, 35 T.C. 1117 (1959).
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to be included in gross income. Thus, the statutory language, instead of
resolving the gift-compensation problem created by the 1939 Code, per-
petuates the problem as a scholarship or fellowship-compensation problem
under section 117. The purpose of this comment is to determine how the
Service and the courts have faced the problem.
II. THE OFFIML SOLUTION-THE REGULATIONS
A. Definitions and Requirements
The regulations have done little to remedy the construction problem.
For the most part they deal with the problems that arise after it has been
determined that an amount qualifies as a scholarship or fellowship, e.g., the
calculation of the amount to be excluded."' Thus, in dealing with the
threshold question of what payments qualify, the regulations are unfor-
tunately no better than the Code. It is apparent that:
a proper reading of the statute requires that before the exclusion
comes into play there must be a determination that the payment
sought to be excluded has the normal characteristics associated
with the term 'scholarship'. 12
However, the regulations do not describe these "normal characteristics,"
but rather characterize the terms broadly, and then list certain items which
do not qualify. A scholarship is "an amount paid . . . to . .. a student
to aid such individual in pursuing his studies"; a fellowship is "an amount
paid.., for the benefit of an individual to aid him in his studies." These
broad statements are of little value in solving the problem of whether a
particular payment is a scholarship or is compensation.
Most disputes concerning the wording of the regulations have arisen
because of the Treasury's attempt to list the categories of payments which
it would not consider to be scholarship or fellowship grants. These cate-
gories are: (1) payments under which the recipient is subject to the super-
vision or direction of the grantor;13 (2) payments which represent compen-
sation for past, present, or future services; 14 or (3) payments which enable
the recipient to pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of
the grantor, unless the primary purpose of the grant is to further the edu-
cation of the recipient in his individual capacity. 15 With these categories
the Treasury has written additional qualifications into the Code which in-
dicate that its current position on these grants is strikingly similar to its pre-
1954 position, i.e., the prime consideration is a determination of whether the
payment in any way represents compensation. The official position on the
borderline case is a test phrased in terms of purpose: is the primary pur-
pose to further the education of the recipient in his individual capacity?
The purpose test itself creates difficulties which are discussed below.10
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-1, § 1.117-2 (1956).
12. Elmer L. Reese, 45 T.C. 407, 413 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 378 F.2d 742
(4th Cir. 1967).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) (1) (1956).
14. Id.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (2) (1956).
16. See infra at IV.
1970]
3
Zwibelman: Zwibelman: Taxability of Scholarships
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
In contrast to the official Treasury position, several authorities17
have felt that Congress, in section 117, recognized that scholarships are
"esufficiently unique in terms of their social function, and in the frame-
work in which they are employed, to merit separate treatment from that
accorded gifts and compensation."' I s Their belief is that the regulations
which perpetuate the pre-1954 gift-compensation test are "an attempt to
write into [section 117] a concept which was considered and intentionally
rejected by the Congress which enacted the Code." 19
Apparently, the one thing that is clear about the words "scholarship"
or "fellowship" is that the use of these terms by the grantor is meaningless.
For example, a business advertised the prize in its contest as a "scholarship
to the college of your choice." Although the company encouraged the
winner to use the award for education, there were no restrictions on the
use of the prize money. The Service ruled that these payments could not
be considered a scholarship for purposes of section 117 because of the
lack of restriction on their use. 20 In the same manner, merely because the
grantor does not treat the payments as scholarships in his own bookkeep-
ing system will not mean that they will fail to qualify for exclusion under
the section. In Chander P. Bhalla,21 a decision in which the Treasury
acquiesced, 22 the court placed no significance on how the grantor treated
the payment because it felt that the granting institution, not knowing how
the grant should be treated for tax purposes, might have been overly cau-
tious.
B. The Problem in Context: Johnson v. Bingler23
The validity of the regulations was upheld by the Supreme Court
recently in the case of Johnson v. Bingler. Taxpayer, an employee of the
Westinghouse Corporation at a facility owned by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, pursuant to a Westinghouse fellowship and doctoral program,
received an educational leave from his employment and a grant amounting
to 80 per cent of his former salary, to research, write, and defend a Ph.D.
thesis in engineering. The dissertation topic was subject to the approval
of the Atomic Energy Commission. The stated purpose of the Westing-
house program was to aid in meeting the needs of Westinghouse for key
professional personnel. Each recipient of a grant and leave was required
to agree to continue working for Westinghouse upon completion of his
educational leave for a period of at least two years. While on leave he
17. See the decision of Judge Weiner in Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258
(3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 741 (1969); Chommie, Services Rendered, Not
Donative Intent, Governs Exemption of Study Grants, 4 J. TAXATION 375 (1956);
Gordon, Scholarships and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for Treasury
Policy, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 144.
18. Gordon, Scholarships and Fellowship Grants as Income: A Search for
Treasury Policy, 1960 WAsr. U.L.Q. 144, 151.
19. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d. 258, 260 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S.
741 (1969).
20. REv. RUL. 65-58, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 37.
21. Chander P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13 (1960).
22. REv. RUL. 63-250, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 79.
23. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
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retained his seniority status and received all employee benefits. Westing-
house deducted the payments on its return and withheld tax from pay-
ments to taxpayer, who in turn filed a refund claim on the ground that
the payments were excludable as a scholarship under section 117. This
claim was rejected both by the Commissioner, who viewed the payments
as compensation, and later by a jury in a refund suit in federal district
court which found the payments were taxable income.24 Reversing the
judgment in favor of the United States, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the regulations and the instructions to the jury based on them
were invalid and that as a matter of law the grant was excludable as a
scholarship. The Court of Appeals stated: "any reasonable stipend which
comes within the common understanding of what constitutes a scholarship
... is excluded from gross income." 25 By this decision the court created a
direct conflict with other circuits which had either upheld the validity of
the regulation or had sustained lower court conclusions to that effect.26
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict and to de-
termine the proper scope of section 117 and the regulation.
In its first examination of section 117, the Supreme Court did little
more than state the general proposition that "regulations 'must be sus-
tained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with revenue statutes'
and 'should not be overruled except for weighty reasons'."2 7 The Court,
declaring that the regulations under section 117 were not unreasonable,
thus ruled in the Government's favor. It believed that Congress had tried
to insure that payments which were a continuing salary would not escape
taxation merely because they also fit into the broad definition of a scholar-
ship and that the Treasury had permissibly implemented this underlying
Congressional concern. The Court inferred from the legislative history
that Congress did not intend all grants to students to be excludable. The
Court cited Section 117(b)(2), which severely limits excludability of pay-
ments to non-degree candidates, as an example of the precautions that
Congress took in an area that it felt was open to abuse.
The Third Circuit in Johnson, through use of the canon of construc-
tion, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, had reasoned that, by applying
the limitation on the exclusion only to payments to non-degree candidates
and a limited class of degree candidates, Congress had intended the restric-
tion in the Code to be the only restriction. The Supreme Court, however,
did not believe that the added restrictions of Regulation § 1.117-4, exclud-
ing amounts received as compensation from the term scholarship, were
"plainly inconsistent" with the intent of Congress. The high court thus
rejected the expressio argument.
24. 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 426 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
25. 396 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir. 1968).
26. Reese v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967); Stewart v. United
States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721
(10th Cir. 1963) ; Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961); Reiffen
v. United States, 376 F.2d 883 (Ct. C1. 1967).
27. 394 U.S. at 750, quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co.,
333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
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III. EXCLUDED CATEGORIES (1) AND (2) oF TREAs. REG. § 1.117-4 (c):
COMPENSATION PER SE
By its ruling in Johnson, the court has approved regulations which
give rise to inconsistent rulings and decisions. 28 Unless the Treasury De-
partment rewrites these regulations, 29 taxpayers must live with a case by
case approach; and in view of the Supreme Court's decision, it is not likely
that the regulations will be made more precise.
The regulations state that a payment is not to be considered a scholar-
ship if it represents compensation for past, present, or future services. 80
The courts, however, have not literally followed this regulation, and have
consistently held that a scholarship or fellowship "may be compensatory
in character [but] that with the enactment of Section 117 of the 1954
Code, it no longer follows that such amounts are to be included in gross
income merely because they were in the nature of compensation for serv-
ices rendered."8 ' At the same time, however, some courts have recognized
that certain factors "are such indicia of 'compensation for past, present,
or future services" 3 2 as to be excluded from the definition of scholarship and
fellowship. These indicia usually include: (1) taxpayer's activities sub-
ject to the supervision of the grantor or (2) the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. The problem, therefore, is to determine how the
Service and the courts differentiate between a payment that is considered
compensation and a payment for employment services which is excludable
under the section.
A. Supervision by the Grantor
The regulations clearly state that generally a payment is not to be
considered a scholarship for services subject to the direction or supervision
of the grantor.33 The Commissioner, relying on this mandate, will often
rule for or against exclusion on this factor alone.8 4 The courts, however,
have not been so dogmatic. In William Wells,35 a taxpayer, as part of a Ph.D.
program in clinical psychology, enrolled in a training program with the
Veteran's Administration. She was compensated by the Veteran's Admin-
28. See cases cited in Meyers, Tax Status of Scholarships and Fellowships, 22
TAx LAWYER 391 (1969). See also Edward A. Jamieson, 51 T.C. 685 (1969). In
Stephen L. Zolnay, 49 T.C. 389, 395 (1968), Judge Tannewald stated, "[s]uffice to
say that the decided cases ran the gamut of the full spectrum with all its shadings,
making precisional line-drawing [under section 117] impossible."
29. In REv. RUL. 65-146, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 66, the Commissioner announced
that the Regulations to § 117 were in the process of revision. No such revision,
or proposed revision, has yet been published.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) (1) (1956).
31. Frank Thomas Bachmura, 32 T.C. 1117, 1125 (1959).
32. Stewart v. United States, 363 F.2d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 1966).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.1174(c) (1) (1956).
34. See Woodail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963), and
Anderson v. United States, 61-1 USTCas. 9162. In Anderson, the jury was instructed
that if the payments to taxpayer were for services which were subject to the
supervision of the grantor, this would indicate that the payment was not a
s 5. T.C. 40 (1963).
[Vol. 85
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istration, at an hourly rate for the time she worked. The Commissioner
argued that, since the training program was supervised by the hospital
and university, the amounts received should be automatically denied schol-
arship treatment. The court rejected this argument and stated that such a
rule would bring about a result clearly contrary to the provisions of the
statute-elimination of university research fellowships performed under
university supervision. Although supervision by the grantor is certainly
evidence that the payment is compensation, in light of Wells, the presence
or absence of supervision does not appear to control its tax treatment.
B. The Employment Obligation Test
The existence of an employer-employee relationship usually raises
a strong presumption that payment is compensation, hence not excludable.
The Government usually contends that any time there is a commitment
to work for the grantor in the future, the grant represents compensation.
This contention has not always been followed by the courts. In Aileen
Evans,36 petitioner agreed to work for a period of time equal to that
needed to complete her training. The court held that the only services
which nullify the exclusion are those rendered at the time the payment
is made. This analysis removes a contract for future services from considera-
tion in determining if an exclusion is to be granted. Although the decision
in Evans was a departure from previous published rulings,37 the Service
stated that it would follow this ruling in disposing of similar cases.88 How-
ever, the taxpayer in Evans was not in the grantor's employment before the
grant was made, hence the Service and the courts have distinguished Evans
on this point. 9 Thus, before Johnson v. Bingler, the exclusion of a pay-
ment under section 117, when a future obligation existed, depended on
the status of the recipient at the time of the grant.
The Supreme Court, in Johnson, held that the true meaning of the reg-
ulation dealing with compensation is that "bargained for payments, given
only as a quo in return for the quid of services rendered-whether past,
present, or future-should not be excludable from income as 'scholarship'
funds." 40 It would appear, therefore, that the ruling in Evans is no longer
good law, and that now, any employment relationship may nullify the ex-
clusion under section 117.
C. The Percentage of Compensation Test
Courts have generally treated the fact that a former employer makes
a grant which equals or is based on the employee's former salary as indic-
36. 34 T.C. 720 (1960), acquiesced in R.v. RuL. 65-146, 1965-1 Cumi. BULL. 66.
37. See e.g., REv. RuL. 55-347, 1955-1 Cumu. BULL. 21; REv. RuL. 57-370, 1957-2
Cum. BULL. 105; REv. RuL. 58-322, 1958-1 GuM. BULL. 59.
38. Rzv. RUL. 75-146, 1965-1 Cum. BuLL. 66.
39. In R.v. RuL. 65-146, 1965-1 Gum. BULL. 66, the Service stated that
Evans was distiguishable from cases in which the employee had been in the
grantor's employment before the commencement of the education. The Service
cited Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961) and Stewart v. United
States, 363 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1966), as examples of this previous employment.
40. 394 U.S. at 757.
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ative of compensation which precludes scholarship or fellowship treatment.
Such was the view of the court in Ussery v. United States,41 a case involving
a program in which certain employees were granted a leave of absence to
pursue their studies. During the absence, the employees were given monthly
payments equal to their previous salary. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that such payments indicated that the program was "in effect employee
training sponsored by the employer and undertaken by the employee as
part of his employment." Some courts, however, have recognized that while
a scholarship or fellowship is based partly on need, payments are often
designed to permit a scholar to maintain his accustomed standard of liv-
ing. Thus, a relationship of the size of the grant to a prior salary need not
destroy the scholarship status of a grant.4 2 This seems to be entirely con-
sistent with the purpose of section 117, which was designed to aid students,
especially at the graduate level, who might be placed in a position of hard-
ship if they left work to attend school. However, this enlightened view
was not endorsed by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Bingler. The Court
reasoned that such a result would be anomalous in view of the fact that,
under the section, the "comparatively modest sums" received by part-time
teaching assistants are clearly subject to taxation, and that Congress did
not intend to sanction such an inequitable result.43 It therefore appears
that a grant based on a large percentage of former salary will in the future
be a factor that weighs heavily against exclusion from income, particularly
where the amount is large in relation to typical scholarship grants.
IV. EXCLUDED CATEGORY (8) OF TREAs. REG. § 1.117-4 (c):
THE PRIMARY PuRPosE TEST
Even though an employer-employee relationship may exist, the Service,
in its regulations and rulings, and most courts usually apply a test based
on the primary purpose of the grant rather than one based on indicia of
compensation. This final restriction is treated as controlling over the other
restrictions in the regulations. Even if the work is to be performed under
the supervision of the grantor and even if a particular payment has all
the indicia of compensation, the payment may still be excludable if the
primary purpose of the grant is to benefit the recipient in his individual
capacity. 44
As one court stated:
whether a payment qualifies as a scholarship or fellowship grant
excludable from Section 117 . . . depends upon whether the pri-
mary purpose of the payment is to further the education and train-
ing of the recipient or whether the primary purpose is to serve
the interest of the grantor.45
41. 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Stephen L. Zolney, 49 T.C. 389
(1968), and John E. McDonald, 52 T.C. 393 (1969).
42. See e.g., the court of appeals decision in Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d
258 3d Cir. 1968).
43. 394 U.S. at 751.
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Determining the primary purpose of the grant becomes difficult when it
appears, as in most cases, that there is a mutual benefit from it. The ques-
tion of primary purpose "must be resolved on a factual basis and depends
upon the facts and circumstances in each particular case." 46 Due to the
necessity of a case by case analysis, no useful guidelines have been developed.
A. Whose Purpose Is to Be Emphasized?
The first problem raised by the primary purpose test is a determina-
tion of whose purpose is to be adopted as the standard of measurement-
the grantor's or the grantee's? In Elmer L. Reese,47 taxpayer, as a candidate
for a teaching degree, was required to teach in a public school. For teach-
ing, taxpayer received the normal pay of a similarly qualified teacher.
The court in that case held that the determinative purpose was that of
the grantor. However, in Commissioner v. Ide,48 taxpayer's son received
financial assistance while at college in connection with his enrollment in
the Navy R.O.T.C. program. This program obligated him to render services
to the Navy in the future. The court, in discussing the problem of whose
purpose is controlling, stated:
under this regulation, the determinative consideration is not the
primary purpose of the grantor in subsidizing the student, but
rather the primary purpose of and the primary benefit from the
subsidized study.49
There are sound reasons to support the view in Ide. Frequently a grantor's
purpose in making a payment is not completely benevolent. The grantor
expects to receive something in return, e.g., a future employee or access to
the results of research performed by the student. In these cases the grantor
is interested in something more than "furthering the education and train-
ing of the recipient in his individual capacity." Thus if the view in Reese
is followed, these cases are to be resolved on a case by case basis because
even if the payment is made to the student with "no strings attached," the
fact that the grantor will receive some benefit in return will raise a
factual question of primary purpose. If, however, the purpose of the re-
cipient is controlling, as in Ide, the sole question is whether the grantee
it to be classified as an independent student or as an employee doing work
at a university. Such a test would be easier to administer and arguably
would be more consistent with the intent of Congress to eliminate from
scholarship treatment only continuing payments of salary. But this approach
may in practice prove too much, for the student will always say that it is
primarily for his educational benefit, and then marshall facts to support
his view.
The trend of rulings, both by the Treasury and the courts, is toward
the view that the purpose of the grantor is controlling, and if the pur-
pose of the grant is not primarily to aid the student, the grant is taxable.5 0
46. Id.
47. 45 T.C. 407 (1966), af 'd, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
48. 335 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964).
49. Id. at 855.
50. See e.g., REv. RUL. 57-484, 1957-2 Curi. BULL. 118.
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This writer believes such a view could lead to an unsatisfactory result in
a given case. Often the source of the grant is a charitable foundation or
governmental agency desiring research. To speak of benefit to the grantor
in such a case is somewhat meaningless because the purpose of these grants
is not to benefit the institution, but rather to render a service to the general
public. Even though a grant of this nature is one of the most common
examples of fellowship grants prior to the passage of this section,5 ' the
present law requires that if the student's betterment is not the primary
purpose of the grant, it is taxable. A related problem arises because many
governmental or foundation grants are made to an institution or a pro-
fessor, and not directly to the individual student. The institution or pro-
fessor will then grant a particular student a stipend to aid in research.
If the Treasury, in determining the excludability of the stipend, looks to
the primary purpose of the grantor in making the grant, which grantor
should it look to-the original grantor or the "middle man"? It is because
of these problems that the application of the regulation to these types of
cases has caused the most litigation concerning the section.
B. Research, Degree Candidates, Post Degree Recipients
For some time after the adoption of the regulations to section 117 in
1956, the Service maintained that no fellowship existed when an individ-
ual received payments to do research from a university or governmental
agency.5 2 The belief was that the purpose of the services rendered was the
benefit of the grantor; thus, the payment did not qualify for exclusion
under the primary purpose test.
The courts have not always followed this interpretation, particularly
when the payment was made to a candidate for a degree. In Lawrence
Spruch,5 3 taxpayer, while working on a Ph.D., received a fellowship grant
from the university to conduct research within her field of study. The
Commissioner contended that the primary purpose of the research was
to benefit the interests of the university rather than to enable the taxpayer
to pursue her studies. The Tax Court, in holding for the taxpayer, re-
jected the government's arguments. Evidently the Court was more concerned
with benefit to the taxpayer than with benefit to the grantor. After the
ruling in Spruch, and a similar holding in Chander P. Bhalla,54 the
Service announced that it would follow these rulings in disposing of similar
degree candidate cases. 55
Based on the facts in Spruch and Bhalla, this Revenue Ruling indi-
cates that a stipend should be presumed to be primarily for the purpose
of furthering the education of the recipient if equivalent research is re-
quired of all students and if the student will receive credit for the research
performed under the grant. The primary purpose test of the Regulations
was designed by the Treasury to assure that only payments which Con-
51. See I.T. 4056, 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 8.
52. See e.g., REv. R UL. 62-122, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 12; REv. RUL. 58-322,
1958-1 CUAt. BULL. 59.
53. 20 T.C.M. 324 (1961).
54. 35 T.C. 13 (1960).
55. REv. RUL. 63-250 1963-2 Cum. BuL. 79.
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gress intended as scholarships will be given that treatment. The facts in
Spruch and Bhalla seem clearly to fit within the "letter, spirit, and the
intent of the last sentence of Section 117(b)(1)," 56 which grants the ex-
clusion to degree candidates required to work as a condition of the
grant, if all candidates for the degree have to work. In effect, the Service
has held it will follow the mandate of the Code.
The Treasury has been more willing to engage in a strict interpretation
of the primary purpose test when the taxpayer is not a candidate for a
degree. It has consistently attempted to deny exclusion where services are
rendered, contending that such services are primarily for the benefit of
the grantor, and hence, taxable. Some courts, however, have not been as
strict and are willing to grant the exclusion to a non-degree candidate if
he can establish that the services rendered provide the grantor with little
or no benefit.
The most frequently litigated cases for those not candidates for a
degree involve individuals engaged in health care, not yet fully qualified
in their field, but who are capable of rendering services of some value, e.g.,
interns, residents or nurses. In most of these cases 57 the Service has found
that the taxpayers were primarily performing a service for compensation,
even though they were also acquiring training and experience in their
specialties. These rulings were based on the fact that the taxpayers were
rendering services necessary to the grantor to carry out its function.
However, where the taxpayer has been able to establish that the pay-
ments were made primarily to further his education, the courts have
allowed the exclusion. The cases indicate that the taxpayer must show
that (1) the principal purpose of the granting institution is not the care
and treatment of patients, but the development of the individual, and (2)
that, although the taxpayer's services were of some value, his absence would
not require the hiring of a replacement.
In Wrobleski v. Bingler,58 taxpayer, a graduate physician, participated
in a program leading to certification by the American Board of Psychiatry
and Neurology. The program required performance of clinical services at
designated hospitals. Taxpayer's hospital was not primarily a service or-
ganization. The patients were selected, from persons already confined in
other hospitals, in an effort to provide the cross section of cases necessary
for teaching, research, and training. The program at the hospital also
included extensive classroom and seminar activity. The court in Wrobleski
distinguished this institution from the ordinary hospital "where interns
and residents are accepted for training in the performance of the type
of services it is customarily the business of hospitals to furnish." The court
also found that the hospital already had an ample staff and that the
taxpayer was of no primary or material benefit to the institute within the
meaning of the primary purpose test. The court therefore granted the ex-
clusion.
56. Chander P. Bhalla, 35 T.C. 13, 17 (1960).
57. See REv. RUL. 56-101, 1956-1 Cus. BULL. 89; REv. Rut. 57-386, 1957-2
Cum. BuLL. 105; REv. RUL. 65-117, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 67; RE-v. RUL. 68-250,
1968-2 Cutm. BULL. 58.
58. 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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In Ethel Bonn,59 the court found that the hospital in question was a
general service hospital, organized and operated for the care and treatment
of patients. The relative value of a case to the training of residents did
not affect the hospital's admissions policy. The court also found that,
should taxpayer be eliminated as a member of the staff, a new physician
would have to be hired. Based on these facts, the court held that the
taxpayer's situation was "diametrically opposed" to that in Wrobleski,
and denied the exclusion.
Between these two clearly delineated situations, however, is a vast gray
area in which the usual fact situation will typically arise. Since the issue
in the primary purpose test is one of fact, neither the cases nor the rul-
ings provide particularly useful guidelines. The possible inconsistent re-
sults in this area are best illustrated by two recent cases. In Pappas v.
United States,60 a resident studying gynecology and obstetrics at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas medical center was allowed an exclusion under section
117. In Lingl v. Charles,61 a resident studying psychiatry at a state hos-
pital in Ohio was denied the exclusion. Both cases involved jury verdicts.
It seems, therefore, that the tax status of payments to interns and residents
is far from clear.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 117 was enacted in 1954 to resolve the problems created by
prior case law in determining excludability under the gift-compensation
test. From 1954-1968 the Treasury, and a majority of the lower courts,
have continued to base their decisions on pre-1954 criteria, while taxpayers
have argued that section 117 was intended to eliminate the gift-compensa-
tion test from the taxation of educational grants. When certiorari was
granted in Johnson v. Bingler, it was hoped that the Court would dear
up the difficulties in distinguishing between excludable scholarship grants
and includable compensatory payments. But in upholding the regulations,
the Supreme Court in Johnson merely perpetuated the problem which
was present before adoption of section 117. Possibly Congress can remedy
this situation with curative legislation; however, if experience with section
117 is any guide, this may only make matters worse.
MYRON S. ZWIBELMAN
59. 34 T.C. 64 (1960).
60. 19 A.F.T.R.2d 1276 (D.C. Ark. 1967).
61. 21 A.F.T.R.2d 410 (D.C. Ohio 1967).
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